NIYATI NATH, THE HINDU BUSINESS LINE
3rd January, 2013
Global money laundering laws should be strengthened to nab kingpins of maritime piracy, not just their foot soldiers.
In recent years, piracy has emerged as a significant threat to global maritime interests. The International Maritime Bureau reports 223 acts of piracy in the year 2012, as of August 2012. While the incidence of Somali piracy has reduced, disproportionate increases have been recorded in other parts of the world, such as Nigeria, the Gulf of Guinea, Togo and South East Asia. Piracy is a growing industry.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has established the legal definition of piracy in international law. UNCLOS does not, however, provide for investigatory or prosecutorial procedures or guidelines for international co-operation. It accords universal jurisdiction for piracy; any state is authorised to prosecute the crime of piracy committed on the high seas.
LEGAL HURDLES
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 obliges contracting governments to either extradite or prosecute alleged offenders. The 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages requires contracting states to criminalise the taking of hostages. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has published model laws on mutual assistance in criminal matters, witness protection, extradition and money-laundering and financing of terrorism that focus on the substantive obligations arising from international conventions. States may use the model laws as a starting point while drafting their own laws.
Universal jurisdiction does not apply when crimes are committed in territorial waters. A state must criminalise the offence of piracy if it is to prosecute the offence domestically. Model legislation helps domestic legal systems to prosecute in a manner consistent with international law.
Reportedly, hundreds of Somali pirates are currently incarcerated in other countries, awaiting trial. Many of these countries have not yet criminalised piracy and the pirates are charged with general crimes such as armed robbery and attempt to murder. Often, they are quietly released on the high seas to reduce the burden on the legal system.
Efforts to bring pirates to justice in domestic courts have foundered due to various legal and practical challenges. Not all countries mete out the same punishment. Kuwait and the Republic of Korea, among others, have imposed the death penalty. Countries that impose less severe sentences are reluctant to extradite pirates to these countries for trial.
Other factors that affect domestic trials are a lack of clarity with respect to the steps that capturing ships must take so as not to breach the pirates’ human rights and difficulties in preserving and transporting evidence. Countries such as Denmark have sought to address some of these problems by issuing guidelines to naval vessels on collection of evidence and communication between authorities in order to support a prosecution for piracy.
Overseeing a prosecution can be costly and logistically challenging and this has contributed to a general reluctance to prosecute. In 2010, the EU’s Atalanta anti-piracy force stormed a ship that was hijacked by Somali pirates. As the crew of the ship included two Germans, the pirates were extradited to Germany for trial. A regional court in Hamburg commenced a highly publicised trial of the pirates in November 2010. A battery of lawyers, expert witnesses and Somali language interpreters worked to extract information from the defendants regarding the shadowy figures behind them – the individuals who oversee this form of organised crime. While the cost of the trial was reportedly EUR35,000 for each day that the court was in session, no useful information was elicited over 100 days of court-time.
The trial proceedings stretched over almost two years, after which the court handed down its verdict - seven pirates were sentenced six to seven years in prison. However, the defendants are mere foot soldiers as opposed to the kingpins who finance, arm and run the pirate network. The foot soldiers are not privy to information of any value.
The Financial Action Task Force has examined the money flows connected with organised piracy for ransom. It is estimated that of the $238 million in ransom money reportedly paid to Somali pirates in 2010, approximately $95 million was pumped into the international financial system. This has exposed the financial system to money-laundering and financing of terrorism.
Much has been said of links between Somali pirates, the al-Qaida affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist organisation and other terrorist groups operating in the Horn of Africa. Reports indicate that the formal financial system and banks in particular have played a prominent role in the movement of funds. There is a need to detect, investigate and prosecute this kind of money-laundering. This requires a high degree of international co-operation, involving law enforcement agencies, financial investigators and the judiciary.
In many cases, there has been a complete failure to co-operate internationally that has resulted in the trail going cold. In a few cases, the ransom money has been successfully traced due to the co-operation of investigating law enforcement agencies. However, bringing the perpetrators to book requires information of evidentiary value to the judicial system of the prosecuting country and more often than not, the available information does not pass muster.
SOMALIA’S SITUATION
The recent reduction in the incidence of Somali piracy has been on account of the concerted effort of the international navies that patrol the seas and the increased use of armed security personnel aboard. However, piracy cannot be eradicated solely by a maritime-focused effort. The socio-economic reality is that the average Somali has an annual income of US$200.
With few other sources of income, piracy has become embedded in Somali society. Since there is little chance of those engaged in piracy being caught and punished, there is no effective deterrent. Government institutions, law enforcement and judicial structures are fragmented or non-existent. It is almost impossible to track the movement of ransom payments in Somalia and when detected, to successfully prosecute cases of piracy.
The UN and the international community have done much to rebuild the collapsed Somali governance infrastructure. Efforts to build capacity in Somalia include setting up and training a domestic police force, building court rooms and prisons, training and equipping prosecutors and the judiciary and providing legal resources. It is hoped that Somali pirates will eventually be successfully prosecuted and serve their sentences in Somalia.
A long-term solution to piracy will require capacity-building at the domestic level and adding value to local economies. International and domestic anti money-laundering laws must be strengthened.
(The author is a partner at J. Sagar Associates. Views expressed are personal.)
3rd January, 2013
Global money laundering laws should be strengthened to nab kingpins of maritime piracy, not just their foot soldiers.
In recent years, piracy has emerged as a significant threat to global maritime interests. The International Maritime Bureau reports 223 acts of piracy in the year 2012, as of August 2012. While the incidence of Somali piracy has reduced, disproportionate increases have been recorded in other parts of the world, such as Nigeria, the Gulf of Guinea, Togo and South East Asia. Piracy is a growing industry.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has established the legal definition of piracy in international law. UNCLOS does not, however, provide for investigatory or prosecutorial procedures or guidelines for international co-operation. It accords universal jurisdiction for piracy; any state is authorised to prosecute the crime of piracy committed on the high seas.
LEGAL HURDLES
The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 1988 obliges contracting governments to either extradite or prosecute alleged offenders. The 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages requires contracting states to criminalise the taking of hostages. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has published model laws on mutual assistance in criminal matters, witness protection, extradition and money-laundering and financing of terrorism that focus on the substantive obligations arising from international conventions. States may use the model laws as a starting point while drafting their own laws.
Universal jurisdiction does not apply when crimes are committed in territorial waters. A state must criminalise the offence of piracy if it is to prosecute the offence domestically. Model legislation helps domestic legal systems to prosecute in a manner consistent with international law.
Reportedly, hundreds of Somali pirates are currently incarcerated in other countries, awaiting trial. Many of these countries have not yet criminalised piracy and the pirates are charged with general crimes such as armed robbery and attempt to murder. Often, they are quietly released on the high seas to reduce the burden on the legal system.
Efforts to bring pirates to justice in domestic courts have foundered due to various legal and practical challenges. Not all countries mete out the same punishment. Kuwait and the Republic of Korea, among others, have imposed the death penalty. Countries that impose less severe sentences are reluctant to extradite pirates to these countries for trial.
Other factors that affect domestic trials are a lack of clarity with respect to the steps that capturing ships must take so as not to breach the pirates’ human rights and difficulties in preserving and transporting evidence. Countries such as Denmark have sought to address some of these problems by issuing guidelines to naval vessels on collection of evidence and communication between authorities in order to support a prosecution for piracy.
Overseeing a prosecution can be costly and logistically challenging and this has contributed to a general reluctance to prosecute. In 2010, the EU’s Atalanta anti-piracy force stormed a ship that was hijacked by Somali pirates. As the crew of the ship included two Germans, the pirates were extradited to Germany for trial. A regional court in Hamburg commenced a highly publicised trial of the pirates in November 2010. A battery of lawyers, expert witnesses and Somali language interpreters worked to extract information from the defendants regarding the shadowy figures behind them – the individuals who oversee this form of organised crime. While the cost of the trial was reportedly EUR35,000 for each day that the court was in session, no useful information was elicited over 100 days of court-time.
The trial proceedings stretched over almost two years, after which the court handed down its verdict - seven pirates were sentenced six to seven years in prison. However, the defendants are mere foot soldiers as opposed to the kingpins who finance, arm and run the pirate network. The foot soldiers are not privy to information of any value.
The Financial Action Task Force has examined the money flows connected with organised piracy for ransom. It is estimated that of the $238 million in ransom money reportedly paid to Somali pirates in 2010, approximately $95 million was pumped into the international financial system. This has exposed the financial system to money-laundering and financing of terrorism.
Much has been said of links between Somali pirates, the al-Qaida affiliated al-Shabaab terrorist organisation and other terrorist groups operating in the Horn of Africa. Reports indicate that the formal financial system and banks in particular have played a prominent role in the movement of funds. There is a need to detect, investigate and prosecute this kind of money-laundering. This requires a high degree of international co-operation, involving law enforcement agencies, financial investigators and the judiciary.
In many cases, there has been a complete failure to co-operate internationally that has resulted in the trail going cold. In a few cases, the ransom money has been successfully traced due to the co-operation of investigating law enforcement agencies. However, bringing the perpetrators to book requires information of evidentiary value to the judicial system of the prosecuting country and more often than not, the available information does not pass muster.
SOMALIA’S SITUATION
The recent reduction in the incidence of Somali piracy has been on account of the concerted effort of the international navies that patrol the seas and the increased use of armed security personnel aboard. However, piracy cannot be eradicated solely by a maritime-focused effort. The socio-economic reality is that the average Somali has an annual income of US$200.
With few other sources of income, piracy has become embedded in Somali society. Since there is little chance of those engaged in piracy being caught and punished, there is no effective deterrent. Government institutions, law enforcement and judicial structures are fragmented or non-existent. It is almost impossible to track the movement of ransom payments in Somalia and when detected, to successfully prosecute cases of piracy.
The UN and the international community have done much to rebuild the collapsed Somali governance infrastructure. Efforts to build capacity in Somalia include setting up and training a domestic police force, building court rooms and prisons, training and equipping prosecutors and the judiciary and providing legal resources. It is hoped that Somali pirates will eventually be successfully prosecuted and serve their sentences in Somalia.
A long-term solution to piracy will require capacity-building at the domestic level and adding value to local economies. International and domestic anti money-laundering laws must be strengthened.
(The author is a partner at J. Sagar Associates. Views expressed are personal.)
No comments:
Post a Comment